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Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND 
Record No. 4520 
iVIRGINIA: 
In the Supreme Court of Appeals held at the Supreme Court 
of Appeals Building in the City of Riehmond on Friday the 
7th day of October, 1955. 
JAMES LAWRENCE DOOLEY, 
against 
Plaintiff in Error, 
COM:M:ONvVEALTH OF VIRGINIA, Defendant in Error. 
From the Circuit Court of Caroline County. 
Upon the petition of James Lawrence Dooley a writ of 
error and supersedeas is awarded him to a judgment rendered 
by the Circuit Court of Caroline County on the 12th day of 
May, 1955, in a prosecution by the Commoll"wealth against 
the said petitioner for a misdemeanor; upon the petitioner, 
or some one for him entering into bond with sufficient surety 
before the clerk of the said Circuit Court in the penalty of 
three hundred dollars, with condition as the law directs; but 
said supersedeas, however, is not to operate to discharge the 
petitioner from custody, if in custody, or to release his bond 
if out on bail. 
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STIPULATIONS OF FACTS. 
1. At approximately 9 :50 P. l\L on Monday, September 6, 
1954, Defendant was operating a motor vehicle on U. S. High-
way No. 1 in Caroline County, Virginia; a Virginia State 
Trooper then and there operated a radar speed-determining 
device, in the manner normally used to measure the speed of a 
motor vehicle, and this device indicated that defendant's motor 
vehicle was traveling at a rate of speed of 62 miles per hour; 
the lawful rate of speed in the area within the scope of the 
radar speed-determining device was, at that time, 55 miles 
per hour. 
2. The above mentioned radar speed-determining device 
was tested on the evening of September 6, 1954, prior to the 
above mentioned operation thereof, and was found to be 
working properly. 
3. After the above mentioned operation of .the radar speed-
determining device, the above mentioned State Trooper 
followed the defendant '' a couple of miles'' before stopping 
him to make the arrest; during this period the State Trooper 
did not observe or attempt to observe any violation of the 
~peed, or other, laws by the defendant. 
4. U. S. Highway No. 1 is properly provided with radar 
warning signs and is properly posted with speed limit signs 
of the type speei:fied in Title 46-Section 215.2 of the Va. Code. 
5. In the Trial .Justice Court of Caroline County, on Sep-
tember 17, 1954, Defendant testified that his speedometer was 
believed to he working properly on the night of September 
6, 1954; and testified further that he did not, at any time, in 
Caroline Connty, on September 6, 1954, observe a speedometer 
reading· of 62 miles per hour, or in excess thereof; and testi-
fied further that he, the defendant, frequently observed the 
reading of his speedometer on September 6, 1954. 
6. Defendant has a reputation for truth and veracity under 
oath. 
page 6 ~ 7. Defendant was convicted in the Trial Justice 
Court of Caroline County of operating a motor ve-
hicle at an excess rate of speed, to-wit, 62 miles per hour, 
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in a 55 miles per hour zone; said Court is not a Court of 
Record; said conviction was based entirely upon evidence 
introduced and accepted under the provisions of Title 46-Sec-
tion 215.2 of the Va. Code. 
Stipulations approved: 
Filed Oct. 4, 1954. 
• • 
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• • 
Filed M:ay 12, '55. 
JAMES LAWRENCE DOOLEY. 
Attorney pro se. 
BER.NARD MAHON, 
Commomvealth 's Attorney, 
Caroline County, Virginia. 
L. M. B. 
OPINION OF THE COURT. 
This is an appeal from the Trial Justice Court which has 
been submitted to the Court on an agreed statement of facts, 
which is as follows: 
''1. At approximately 9 :50 P. M. on Monday September 
6, 1954 defendant was operating a motor vehicle on U.S. High-
way No. 1 in Caroline County, Virginia; a Virginia State 
Trooper then and there operated a radar speed-determinin ~ 
device, in the manner normally used to measure the speed of a 
motor vehicle, and this device, indicated that defendant's mo-
tor vehicle was travelling at a rate of speed of 62 miles per 
hour; the lawful rate of speed in the area within the scope of 
the radar speed-determining device ,vas, at that time, 55 milc:--
per hour. 
'' 2. The above mentioned radar speed-determining device 
was tested on tlle evening of September 6, 1954, prior to tllC' 
above mentioned operation thereof, and was found to bP 
working properly. 
'' 3. After the above mentioned operation of the radar 
speed-determining device, the above mentioned State Trooper 
followed the defendant 'a couple of miles' before stopping 
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him to make the arrest ; during this period the 
page 33 ~ State Trooper did not observe or attempt to ob-
serve any violation of the speed, or other, laws by 
the defendant. 
"4. U. S. Highway No. 1 is properly provided with radar 
warning signs and is properly posted with speed limit signs 
of the type specified in Title 46, Section 21
1
5.2 of the Virginia 
Code. 
'' 5. In the Trial Justice Court of Caroline County on Sep-
tember 17, 1954, defendant testified that his speedometer was 
believed to be working properly on the night of September 
6, 1954; and testified further that he did not at any time in 
Caroline County on September 6, 1954 observe a speedometer 
reading of 62 miles per hour or in excess thereof; and testi-
fied further that he the defendant frequently observed the 
reading of his speedometer on September 6, 1954. 
'' 6. Defendant has a reputation for truth and veracity under 
oath. 
"7. Defendant was convicted in the Trial Justice Court of 
Caroline County on operating motor vehicle at an excess rate 
of speed, to-wit 62 miles per hour, in a 55 mile per hour zone; 
snid Court is not a court of record; said conviction was based 
entirely upon evidence introduced and accepted under the pro-
visions of Title 46-215.2 of the Virginia Code.'' 
From tl1e above statement of facts the Court is of the opin-
ion that the defendant did operate his automobile in violation 
of the law if the result of the radar test is accepted. 
It is contended, however, that Code Section 46-215.2 of the 
Code violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
page 34 ~ Constitution of the United States, and, therefore, 
the result of such test cannot be received in evi-
dence. 
The part of the above section under attack here reads as 
follows: '' The speed of any motor vehicle may be c.hecked 
hv the use of radio-micro waves or other electrical device. 
The results of checks shall be accepted as prima f acie evi-
dence of the speed of such motor vehicle in any court of legal 
proceedings where the speed of the motor vehicle is at issue.'' 
(Italics supplied). 
The first section of Amendment XIV to the Constitution 
of the United States reads as follows: 
'' All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein thev reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law ,vhich shall abridge the privileges 
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or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due proeess of law; nor deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws.'' 
Prima f acie presumptions have been employed in the Crim-
inal laws of this Commomvealth for many years. The Vir-
ginia prohibition laws of 1918 and 1928 contained many sec-
tions providing that the establishment of one fact should be 
prim a f acie evidence of guilt. Thus 4675 ( 20) of the Code 
of 1926 provided that '' all persons found at a distillery where 
ardent spirits are being manufactured shall be deemed prima 
facie guilty of manufacturing the sa.·me or aiding or abetting 
in such manufacture • • • '' 
page 35 ~ In Zi11vmernian v. Commonwealth, 148 Va. 745, 
748, 138 S. E. 569 (1927) the Court said: "Under 
this section the presence of the accused at the still where the 
distilled ardent spirits were being manufactured, alone make~ 
out a prima f acie case of guilt of manufacturing distilled 
ardent spirits ag·ainst the accused. This presinnption. mav be 
rebidted, but the question as to whether it has been rebuttC'd 
is usually one for the jury, especially where there is other 
incriminating evidence." ( Italics supplied). 
See also Johnson v. Commonw·ealth, 142 Va. 639, 128 S. E. 
456 (1925) Kilgoe v. Commonwealth, 139 Va. 581, 123 S. E. 
534 (1924) and Spencer v. Conimonw-ealth, 136 Va. 687, 689, 
116 S. E. 235 (1923). 
Even in the absence of a statute it has long been held that 
the introduction of certain evidence in criminal cases raises 
a pri11ia facie presumption which requires rebuttal evidence 
by the accused. Thus in Hanger v. U. S. 285 U. S. 427, 52 
S. Ct. 417, 76 L. (ed.) 861 (1932) a prosecution for using the 
mails to defraud, the Court said ( 52 S Ct. 419) : '' The rule 
is well settled that proof that a letter properly directed wa~ 
placed in a post office creates a presumption that it reachetl 
its destination in usual time and was actuallv received bv the 
person to whom it was addressed. Rosenthal ,,. TY alke1:, 111 
U. S. 185, 193, 4 S. Ct. 382, 28 L. (ed.) 395. And the fact 
that receipt of the letter subjects the person sending it to 
a penalty does not alter the rule. I cl., p. 194 of 111 U. S. 4 S. 
Ct. 38, 28 L. (ed.) 395. If the indictment had alleged actual 
deJivery of the letter in question the case for the government 
in this particular would lmve been made out by proof that 
the letter thus directed had been placed in the post 
page 36 ~ office for transmission. The burden then, ,woitld 
have been cast upon petitioners to show the con-
trary." (Italics supplied). 
6 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
In ex parte Con.verse, 137 U. S. 624, 632, 34 L. (ed.) 796, 
799 (1891) Mr. Chief Justice Fullcl' speaking for the Court 
said: '' W c repeat as has so often been said before, that the 
Fourteenth Amendment undoubtedly forbids any arbitrary 
deprivation of life, liberty or property, and in the administra-
tion of criminal justice requires that no different or higher 
punishment shall be imposed on one than is imposed on all 
for like offenses, but it was not designed to interfere with the 
power of the State to protect the lives, liberty and property 
of its citizens; nor with the exereise of that power in the 
adjudications of the Courts of a State in administering the 
process provided by the law of the State * * * ''. 
One of the leading cases on this subject is People v. Cannon, 
139 N. Y. 32, 36 A. S. R. 668 (1893). In that case the Legis-
lature of New York enacted a statute which made it unlawful 
for a junk dealer or dealer in second hand articles to have in 
his possession certain kinds of trade-marked bottles without 
the written con:Sent of the owner of the trade mark, and it 
further provided that such possession should pri11ia f aG'ie 
presumed to he in the unlawful use, purchase or traffic in such 
bottles. The validity of this statute, as is the statute in-
volved here, was assailed as ,iolating the due process clause 
of the Constitution. 
The Court held, however, that the act was not in violation 
of the Constitution, as notwithstanding the presumption cre-
ated by the statute the jury should 1·efuse to convict unless 
satisfied from the whole evidence, beyond a reason-
page 37 ~ able doubt, that the accused was guilty. It further 
held that a statute may make the existence of cer-
tain facts prhna facic evidence of the commission of a crime, 
though the explanation of the facts from which the presump-
tion arises is not peculiarly within the knowledge of the per-
son accused. 
In so holding the Court said (36 A. S. R. 679): ''Tbe effect 
of the presumption is to call upon the accused for some expla-
nation. If more be given, the jlll'? may, as I lmve said, still 
refuse to convict, but, if they convict, the vei·dict may be up-
held as founded upon sufficient evidence. The provision fills 
all the requirements of an act of this nature, for it leaves an 
accused a fair opportunity to relieve himself from the pre-
sumption, to explain the circumstances under which the bottles 
came into his possession, and that they were of such nature 
as to show him innocent of an unlawful use, purchase or traffic 
therein.'' 
Of course it is conceded that a statute which created a con-
clusive presumption of guilt would be unconstitutional. 
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But so far as the Court has been able to find it has been a 
common practice for State laws to declare proof of certain 
.acts or facts prima jacie evidence of bruilt and the cases have 
uniformly upheld these statutes. See the review of these au-
thorities in People v~ Cannon, supra. 
In Yee Hem, v. United States, 268 U. S. 178, 183, 45 S. Ct. 
470, 69 L. ed. 904 (1925) the Court quoted from tbe opinion in 
:Mobile J. & K. C. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 48, 55 
L. ( ed.) 78., 80, 81, 31 S. Ct. 136,, 32 L. R. A. (U. S.) 226, 
Ann Cas. 1912-A 463, 2 N. C. C. A. 243 as follows : '' The law 
of evidence is full of presumptions either of fact 
page 38 ~ or of law. The former are, of course, disputable, 
and the strength of any inference of one fact from 
proof of another depends upon the generality of the experi-
ence upon which it is founded • • • 
"Legislation providing that proof of one fact shall consti-
tute prim a f acie evidence of the main fact in issue is but to 
enact a rule of evidence, and quite within the general power 
of government. Statutes national and state, dealing with sueh 
methods of proof in both civil and criminal cases, abound, and 
the decisions upholding them are numerous. 
"That a legislative presumption of one fact from evidence 
of another m~y not constitute a deniul of due process of 
law, or a denial of the e~ual protection of the law, it is only 
essential that there shall be some rational connection between 
the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and that the 
inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so un-
reasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate. So, also, 
it must under the g·uise of regulating the presentation of evi-
dence, operate to preclude the party from the right to present 
his clef ense to the main fact thus presumed.'' 
In Burnett v. C01wmonwealth, 194 Va. 785, 790, 75 S. E. 
(2nd) 482 (1953) Mr. Chief ,Justice Hudgins speaking for the 
Court said: '' The general rule approved by various decisions 
and legal articles is that the test of constitutionality of such 
statutes making proof of a certain fact vri11ia fade or pre-
sumptive evidence of another fact, is whether there is a natural 
and rational evidentiary relation between the fact proven and 
the ultimate fact presumed, and that the inference 
page 39 ~ of one fact from proof of another must not be so 
unreasonable as to be purely arbitrary. To state 
the rule in positive terms, in order for such a statute to be 
valid, there must be some rational connection between the 
fact proved and the ultimate fact to be established.'' 
Snpreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Speaking of the prinia f acie presumption created hy Code 
Section 18-159 the Chief Justice said: "* * * All the statute: 
docs is to create a presumption of a criminal intent from proof· 
of possession of burglarious tools or implements. Such a pre-
sumption is not conclusive; it cuts off no defense. It inter-
poses no obstacles to a contest of all the issues of fact, and 
relieves neither the Court nor the jury of the duty to deter-
mine all of the questions of fact from the weight of the 
whole evidence. 'It is merly a rule of evidence and not the 
<letermination of a fact.' Barton v. Camden, 147 Va. 263,. 
272, 137 Sw E. 465. ·when possession is proven, the burden 
of going forward witll the evidence shifts to the defendant,, 
but this does not shift, the burden of ultimate proof, or de-
prive the defendant of his right to have the jury instructed 
on the presumption of innocence.'' 
It is a well known fact that the excessive use of speed on the 
highways has resulted in deatl1 to thousands of persons every 
year and the loss of millions of dollars worth of property .. 
The speed laws of Virginia before the advent of radar were 
more honored in the breaeh than the observance by a large 
percentage of those driving motor vehicles on the highways. 
The State Police force is entirely too small to · adequately 
police all of the highw·ays of this Commonwealth 
page 40 ~ and even with radar the death tool although some-
what reduced continues to mount. 
There is no difference in principle between the catching of 
speeders with radar ancl the established system of catehing 
them by trailing them in a car with a properly calibrateLl 
speedometer . 
. A.11 that the statute does is to create a pri1na fade presump-
tion that the speed of a vehicle was that registered by the 
radar machine. This does not dispense with the necessity 
for the Commonwealth to prove that the machine was in ,vork-
ing order at the time the test was made nor does it dispense 
with the presumption of innocence or prevent the accused 
from interposing any one or more of a number of defenses 
to rebut this vrima facie presumption. The presumption here 
is not conclusive; '' it cuts off no defense. It interposes no 
obstacle to a contest of all the issues of fact, and relieves 
neither the Court nor the jury of the duty to determine all 
of the questions of fact from the weight of the whole evi-
dence.'' Burnett v. Commonwealth, siipra. 
For the foregoing reasons it is held that Code Section 46-
215.2 (Acts 1954 c. 313) does not violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and is a valid enactment. 
The parties having stipulated that the radar device was 
tested on the evening of 6 September, 1954, prior to its use 
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in measuring the speed of the vehicle operated by the accused, 
and was found to be working properly and that it registered 
the speed of accused's vehicle at 62 miles per hour and the 
accused having failed to rebut the prinia fade 
page 40-a } presumption created by the statute by being un-
able to testify what his speedometer was register-
ing at the time the radar measured lus speed~ the ace.used will 
be convicted of operating his motor at a speed of 62 miles per 
hour and the same fine imposed by the trial justice will be 
imposed. 
April 13~ 1955. 
LEON M. BAZILE, Judge. 
page 41} 
This day came the Attorney for the Commonwealth and 
the accused appeared in Court in answer to his recognizance 
and being represented by counsel, and having pleaded not 
guilty to the charges in the warrant and waived trial by jury 
on the 11th clay of October, 1954, and the Court on this day 
after listening to the evidence and the argument of counsel 
lmving directed that the Attorney for the Commonwealth and 
the Attorney for the accused file briefs on the law on the 
charges in this case within thirty days of the 11th. day of Oc-
tober, 1954. Said briefs were filed as directed by the Court 
and the Court having carefully examined same filed a written 
opinion in this case. In said opinion the Court held that the 
accused was guilty as charged in the warrant and that the 
same fine be imposed that was imposed in the Trial Justice 
Court. Therefore it is ordered and decreed by this Court that 
the said James Lawrence Dooley is guilty of operating a moto1· 
vehicle at a speed of sixty-two (62) miles per hour in a fifty-
five ( 55) mile per hour zone, on the 6th. day of September, 
1954 in Caroline County, Virginia and that the said James 
Lawrence Dooley is fined ten dollars ($10.00) and that he pay 
the cost in these proceedings. 
Enter May 12, 1955. 
LEON M. BAZILE, Judge . 
• • • • • 
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RECORD .. 
I. Defendant was tried in the Circuit Court of Caroline 
County on October 4,.1954, for the crime of operating a motor 
vehicle at an unlawful rate of speed of 62 miles per hour in 
a 55 miles per hour zone on U. S. Route 1, on September 6,. 
1954. 
IL All of the' facts of the case were stipulated, in writing" 
by the Defendant and the Commonwealth's Attorney, and are 
a part of this Record. 
III. Defendant contended that evidence obtained from a 
radar speed determining device should not be considered by 
the Court until the Commonwealth established that, on Sep-
tember 6,. 1954,. radar warning signs were posted thrnughout 
the Commonwealth, as required by Title 46, Section 215.2(c) 
Va. Code (Supp. 1954). 
Defendant further contended that Sec. 215.2(.c) sets up a 
condition precedent to the use of radar in checking the speed 
of motor vehicles and to the consideration by the Court of 
evidence emanating from such radar machines. 
page 43 ~ IV. The Commonwealth failed to establish that 
all of the signs required by Sec. 215.2(2) were 
posted throughout the Commonwealth on September 6, 1954. 
V. The Court rejected these contentions and made two hold-
ings~ 
1. That, it having been stipulated that the signs were prop-
erly posted on U. S. Route 1, on September 6. 1954, as to de-
fendant in the present case, the requirement had been satisfied, 
and whether such signs were properly posted elsewhere in 
the Commomvealth was not germane. 
2. That the Court would take judicial notice of the proper 
posting of radar warning signs throughout the Common-
wealth, on the basis of a letter directed to the Court by Gen-
eral James A. Anderson, dated September 15, 1954, stating 
that radar warning signs were properly posted throughout the 
Commonweal th on September 15, 1954. 
VI. Defendant noted a timely objection to each of the above 
holdings. 
VII. Defendant made a timely objection to the considera-
tion of evidence emanating from a radar speed determining 
device on the grounds that Sec. 215-2 (a) was unconstitutional 
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/inasmuch as it is violative of the due process clause of the 
/. Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States. 
page 44 ~ VIII. The Court held, in an opinion dated May 12, 
1955, that Sec. 215.2(a) was not unconstitutional 
as violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
On May 12, 1955, the Defendant was found guilty of operat-
ing a motor vehicle at a speed of 62 miles per hour in a 55 
miles per hour zone, and was fined ten dollars. 
Filed 6/24/55. 
page 45 ~ 
LEON M. BAZILE, Judge. 
June 12, 1955. 
BERNARD MAHON, Common-
wealth's Attorney, Caroline 
County. 
JAMES LAWRENCE DOOLEY. 
Attorney pro se 
730 Fifteenth Street, N. W., 
·washington 5, D. C. 
G. GALT BREADY, 
Attorney for Defendant, 
Herndon, Virginia. 
M.A.F. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL AND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. 
To the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Caroline County: 
Counsel for James Lawrence Dooley, the defendant in the 
aboYe styled case in the Circuit Court of Caroline County, 
Virg-inia, ]1ereby give notice of appeal from the judgment of 
the Court entered in this case on May 12, 1955 and set forth 
the following Assignments of Error: 
1. The Court erred in holding that Sec. 215.2(a) of Title 
46, Va. Code (Supp. 1954) was not violative of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
2. The Court erred in holding that it was not incumbent on 
the Commonwealth to prove that radar warning signs were 
12 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
posted throughout the Commonwealth as required by Sec. 
215.2(c) on the date of the alleged crime. 
3. The Court erred in talring judicial notice of the proper 
placement of radar warning signs throughout the Common-
wealth on the date of the alleg·ed crime on the basis of a letter 
from General James A. Anderson which stated that radar 
warning signs were properly posted throughout the Common-
wealth eight days after the alleged crime. 
# 
G. GALT BREADY, 
Attorney for Defendant, 
Herndon, Virginia. 
JAMES LAWRENCE DOOLEY, 
Attorney prose . 
• • • 
A Copy-Teste ~ 
H. G. TURNER, Clerk. 
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